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This research seeks to determine the success of turnaround strategies adopted by corporations in Thailand following post‐bankruptcy reorganization plans approved by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court.

The study uses a sample of 101 companies whose reorganization plans have been confirmed by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court in the period 1999‐2002, with performance measures to 2005.

The results indicate that over a three‐year reorganization period successful companies were found to be most likely to adopt cost and expense reduction, company size reduction and disposal of non‐core assets while operational strategies aimed at reconfiguring internal operations and systems were not likely to be associated with successful companies.

The data suggests, subject to limitations, the selection of restructuring methods may differ between those companies which successfully reform and those which do not. Companies pursuing successful turnaround strategies were found most likely to adopt cost and expense reduction, company size reduction and disposal of non‐core assets as significant operational strategy.

Prior research in Thailand has not investigated turnaround strategy of successful and unsuccessful companies. The result of the study has practical significance as it provides information of use to regulators, management, lenders, creditors, practitioners, and investors. The prevailing economic conditions worldwide suggest the need for replication and continual refinement of research in this area, not only in Thailand but elsewhere.

This research seeks to investigate the role of key corporate governance mechanisms in determining a firm's post‐bankruptcy performance following reorganisation.

The study is based on agency theory and uses a unique sample of 111 filing companies whose reorganisation plans have been confirmed by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court during the period 1999‐2002.

The results indicate that monitoring and incentive mechanisms are significant determinants of a firm's post‐bankruptcy performance. The key monitoring mechanism is ownership concentration, measured by shares held by the largest shareholder, whereas the critical incentive mechanisms are cash compensation and percentage of common shares held by the plan administrator. The results indicate that these mechanisms can mitigate agency problems in previously insolvent companies and increase post‐bankruptcy performance over a three year period.

The study is timely given that many organisations are facing rebuilding programs following the impact of the global financial crisis. Prior research in Thailand and elsewhere has not measured bankruptcy reorganisation outcomes in terms of the difference of actual financial performance to predicted performance and in relation to the governance factors of the reorganisation process. Neither has this aspect been considered within an agency theory framework. This provides a unique opportunity to consider these variables based on the theoretical framework of agency theory and to evaluate the importance of governance mechanisms in reorganisation proceedings.